| APrIGF 2024 Session Proposal Submission Form | |||||||||||||||||||
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| Part 1 - Lead Organizer | |||||||||||||||||||
| Contact Person | |||||||||||||||||||
| Mr. Michael Caster | |||||||||||||||||||
| Organization / Affiliation (Please state "Individual" if appropriate) * | |||||||||||||||||||
| ARTICLE 19 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Designation | |||||||||||||||||||
| Asia Digital Programme Manager | |||||||||||||||||||
| Gender | |||||||||||||||||||
| Male | |||||||||||||||||||
| Economy of Residence | |||||||||||||||||||
| Sri Lanka | |||||||||||||||||||
| Primary Stakeholder Group | |||||||||||||||||||
| Civil Society | |||||||||||||||||||
| Part 2 - Session Proposal | |||||||||||||||||||
| Session Title | |||||||||||||||||||
| nfrastructures of repression: Cybersecurity and Human Rights in the Asia Pacific | |||||||||||||||||||
| Session Format | |||||||||||||||||||
| Panel Discussion (60 minutes) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Where do you plan to organize your session? | |||||||||||||||||||
| Onsite at the venue (with online moderator for questions and comments from remote participants) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Specific Issues for Discussion | |||||||||||||||||||
| Internet infrastructure is developing across the region, however at times through opaque partnerships with providers and State actors who combine the provision of infrastructure with the promotion of their own models for internet governance at odds with international norms. The Asia Pacific is experiencing an observable trend in the drafting and adoption of cybersecurity laws and policies which raise serious concerns for the freedom of expression and information online. They appear to put forward a model for internet governance that, rather than a secure, open, and interoperable internet, favor unaccountable State control. This includes requirements that impose censorship and surveillance obligations or vague and overbroad definitions of ‘critical information infrastructure’ in ways that stifle free expression online. This can be seen in Vietnam's cybersecurity law, which took effect in 2019, and its subsequent Decrees imposing concerning localization requirements and restrictive notice and takedown orders, or Cambodia's draft cybersecurity law which seeks to label the media as 'critical information infrastructure' and imposes harsh restrictions and penalties, to Nepal's 2023 National Cybersecurity Policy which among other provisions calls for a national internet gateway. Hong Kong is also expected to adopt its own cybersecurity law, which raises further questions for Hong Kong as a regional hub. Despite these challenges, international human rights law and internet freedom principles offer valuable guidance for shaping this element of internet governance. Alternatives to State control through digital public infrastructure also offer inclusive paths forward. The expert panelists will identify the challenges and relevant international standards to equip researchers, advocates, and policymakers toward positive, rights-based laws and policies on cybersecurity and digital infrastructure governance in Asia Pacific. During the discussion, focus will be given to Taiwan. | |||||||||||||||||||
| Describe the Relevance of Your Session to APrIGF | |||||||||||||||||||
| This session is relevant to this year’s overarching theme of evolving ecosystems and enduring principles. If the current trend progresses, the region will be overrun by cybersecurity policies that fail to adhere to international standards as States tamp down on internet freedom through greater control of expression online and its core infrastructure. This session is about reframing narratives on security and trust to ensure transparency by design and human rights upfront, through multistakeholderism and community engagement rather than multilateralism and State control. It also acknowledges the need for greater connectivity and digital development and posits that merely critiquing rights-abusing pathways to development and digital governance without positioning positive counterexamples will fail to stem the tide of restrictive policies. The topic and discussion is well-suited for this year's APrIGF, but not as a one off. The session is envisioned by ARTICLE 19 as a starting point to develop a more systematic coalition of actors across the region engaged in tracking and counter-acting repressive cybersecurity laws and policies to confront rising digital authoritarianism with rights-based internet governance norms. | |||||||||||||||||||
| Methodology / Agenda (Please add rows by clicking "+" on the right) | |||||||||||||||||||
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| Moderators & Speakers Info (Please complete where possible) | |||||||||||||||||||
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| Please explain the rationale for choosing each of the above contributors to the session. | |||||||||||||||||||
| Michael Caster (moderator) leads ARTICLE 19's work on internet freedom in the Indo-Pacific region. His recent research, in particular, has involved tracking cybersecurity laws and policies around the region and China's influence over internet governance norms through Digital Silk Road partnerships. This work has included analysis and advocacy relating to cybersecurity and 'critical information infrastructure' laws and policies in Cambodia, Malaysia, Nepal, and Thailand. Lulu Keng is a Program Manager with Freedom House, based in Taiwan, where she manages its work on countering digital authoritarianism through the Indo-Pacific Center for Promoting Civil Society Resilience. Prior to this she was the Deputy CEO of Open Culture Foundation, Taiwan’s leading civic-tech and open data organization. She will facilitate the discussion to ensure highlight and inclusion of Taiwan perspectives. Jason Huang is the Acting Deputy Director at the Administration for Cyber Security, Taiwan Ministry of Digital Affairs (Moda), Che-Shang (Jason) Huang. Che-Shang serves as the Senior Specialist for Division of Regulations and International Cooperation, ACS, overseeing the enforcement and amendment of Taiwan's Cyber Security Management Act, as well as the execution of international cooperation matters. Prior to joining MoDA in 2022, Che-Shang worked on international affairs at the Ministry of Labor and as a Labor Attache in Washington DC for Taiwan from 2015 – 2019. Darika Bamrubgchok is a member of both Thai Netizens Network and Security Matters, where she is an expert on digital security and civil society resilience. In addition, Darika has done research and advocacy specifically on Thailand's cybersecurity law and its relevant provisions through ministry regulations and other policies. Santosh Sigdel is the President of Digital Rights Nepal where he has led numerous research and advocacy actions relating to internet governance in the country and around the region. Digital Rights Nepal was one of the leading organizations to engage with the National Cybersecurity Policy in Nepal. |
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| Please declare if you have any potential conflict of interest with the Program Committee 2024. | |||||||||||||||||||
| No | |||||||||||||||||||
| Are you or other session contributors planning to apply for the APrIGF Fellowship Program 2024? | |||||||||||||||||||
| No | |||||||||||||||||||
| Brief Summary of Your Session | |||||||||||||||||||
| Opening remarks: The Asia Pacific is experiencing an observable trend in the drafting and adoption of cybersecurity laws and policies which raise serious concerns for the freedom of expression and information online. They appear to put forward a model for internet governance that favor unaccountable State control. Cybersecurity laws across the region appear to increasingly align with Beijing’s view of digital sovereignty, a mask for justifying restrictions on freedom of expression and the right to privacy, which are the hallmarks of an open, free, and interoperable internet. Such legislations apply to, for example, the management of critical information infrastructure, data localization and identity verification requirements, digital surveillance, an emphasis on opacity, and total government network control through China-style firewalls. This can be seen in Vietnam’s cybersecurity law, which took effect in 2019, and its subsequent Decrees imposing concerning localization requirements and restrictive notice and takedown orders, or Cambodia’s draft cybersecurity law which seeks to label the media as ‘critical information infrastructure’ and imposes harsh restrictions and penalties, to Nepal’s 2023 National Cybersecurity Policy which among other provisions calls for a national internet gateway. Pakistan too, now appears in the process of developing its own Great Firewall. And just last month Hong Kong introduced its own draft Cybersecurity Bill, which echoes many similar concerns regarding overbroad definitions for critical information infrastructure among others. Indeed, in a 2022 white paper, Jointly Build a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace, China’s State Council Information Office emphasized China’s goals of accelerating digital partnerships in the region relating to cybersecurity. It hailed the expansion of partnerships under the National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Centre of China (CNCERT/CC) to 81 countries and the establishment of MOUs with 33, such as Indonesia and Thailand. Since the launch of China’s Digital Silk Road, a decade ago, China has championed this model but despite a growing trend in such an embrace of more authoritarian models of cybersecurity norms and internet governance, strategic systematic research, capacity building, and advocacy to identify and counter such influence in this critical internet governance space in the region remains lacking. Taiwan, at the same time, is unique in this process as both a target of PRC transnational repression and a positive counter-example of best practices in transparency and open digital governance to counterweight such authoritarian models espoused under the Digital Silk Road. |
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| Substantive Summary of the Key Issues Raised and the Discussion | |||||||||||||||||||
| In particular, salient points as relate to Taiwan: - Major threats to society in Taiwan is the external actor, China, - Although China has planned military operations, it has already started an invasion years ago, through the digital space. - Government and citizen has the same objectives, protection against threat of China, how to balance between national security and personal protection, - Not only authoritarian regimes want to build regulations to violate rights, also mature countries like UK, - National human rights commission doesn’t have enough knowledge to protect digital rights, etc. not unique and can’t be addressed by one agency, this is why keep talking about multistakeholderism - Individual rights, according to 603 requiring finger print data in renewing ID card, supreme court justice said no, against constitution, if government can ask for this then in the future can require DNA and genetic information so what country do we want to build together, if citizens cannot escape state surveillance it might be a society without crime but people will face great fear – both social health and efficiency are public interest; o Open, and transparency - Under legal framework, most important part is in the development of the law, dialogue, understanding rights, better ways to understand rights - Especially when facing generative AI, need to work together civil society and tech companies collaborate more - How to maintain an open government under interference under foreign actors, platform (JOIN) anyone in Taiwan can file a proposal on new policy or legislative idea, if 5000 supporters it will be filed to parliament for consideration, this open government policy system clear that since this is open to public, any factors that try to undermine the system everyone can see it, whole of society approach, - Well-known fact-checking tool, another project initiated by civic-tech community, anyone - A closed system will not make us safer, once dominated by a small group of people, no way to monitor and respond, if bad actors are government themselves then harder to create open environment, current government open to work with civil society, but things to improve personal ID number leaked and sold online; - Many civil society organizations lack capacity to monitor and engage with government to improve |
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| Conclusions and Suggestions of Way Forward | |||||||||||||||||||
| ARTICLE 19 is continuing its research on cybersecurity laws and policies and drawing from this panel session we will expand our network of experts in the region. Launching a research report on the topic early next year, following from this session we aim to conduct a regional workshop with interested parties. This was announced by the moderator at the close of the session to solicit interest among participants, to which several did express a desire to remain in contact following the session. ARTICLE 19 will continue to work with the panelists and interested session participants to further unpack these critical issues on cybersecurity laws, policies, and institutions that point to authoritarian and rights-based approaches with the desire to ensure norms and models draw from internet freedom and human rights principles. We will look for opportunities to engage in APrIGF 2025 to highlight lessons learned and build from this conversation at APrIGF 2024. | |||||||||||||||||||
| Number of Attendees (Please fill in numbers) | |||||||||||||||||||
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| Gender Balance in Moderators/Speakers (Please fill in numbers) | |||||||||||||||||||
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| How were gender perspectives, equality, inclusion or empowerment discussed? Please provide details and context. | |||||||||||||||||||
| The organizer took gender representation into consideration when selecting speakers. Gender was not a specific focus of the discussion, however. | |||||||||||||||||||
| Consent | |||||||||||||||||||
 I agree that my data can be submitted to forms.for.asia and processed by APrIGF organizers for the program selection of APrIGF 2024. |
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