| APrIGF 2026 Session Proposal Submission Form | |||||||||||
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| Part 1 - Lead Organizer | |||||||||||
| Contact Person | |||||||||||
| Prof. Masayuki Hatta | |||||||||||
| Organization / Affiliation (Please state "Individual" if appropriate) * | |||||||||||
| Surugadai University / MIAU | |||||||||||
| Designation | |||||||||||
| Professor / Director | |||||||||||
| Gender | |||||||||||
| Male | |||||||||||
| Economy of Residence | |||||||||||
| Japan | |||||||||||
| Stakeholder Group | |||||||||||
| Academia | |||||||||||
| List Your Organizing Partners (if any) | |||||||||||
| Finding qualified speakers in such a niche field like encryption regulation is challenging, but we are still actively searching for collaborators to improve the diversity of the session. | |||||||||||
| Part 2 - Session Proposal | |||||||||||
| Session Title | |||||||||||
| Backdoors, Blackouts, and Big Tech: Mapping Encryption Rules Across the Asia Pacific -- and Filling the Southeast Asian Gap | |||||||||||
| Thematic Track of Your Session | |||||||||||
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| Session Format | |||||||||||
| Showcase (30 minutes) | |||||||||||
| Where do you plan to organize your session? | |||||||||||
| Hybrid (with onsite moderator and speakers both online and offline, with online moderator for questions and comments from remote participants) | |||||||||||
| Specific Issues for Discussion | |||||||||||
| End-to-end encryption (E2EE) is the technology that keeps messages on apps like Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram, and LINE readable only by the sender and the receiver. It has also become one of the most contested points in Internet governance, where privacy, public safety, and national sovereignty collide. This Showcase shares findings from a new comparative study of E2EE regulation across 20 jurisdictions. It sorts national approaches into five types: permissive, conditional-access ("backdoor mandates"), hybrid, prohibitionist, and network-shutdown-dependent. Real cases anchor each type -- the UK's secret order to Apple over iCloud, the EU's "Chat Control" scanning debate, India's "traceability" rule challenged by WhatsApp, and election-time internet blackouts. Two findings travel especially well to this region. First, governments keep demanding "secure backdoors" even though cryptographers have shown for 30 years that these cannot be built safely; we explain why the loop persists and what actually drives it. Second, big platforms increasingly act like "quasi-sovereign" players, resisting some states while complying with others depending on market size and pressure. Here is the honest gap, and the reason we bring this to Kathmandu: the study's "Global South" cases were Brazil, India, South Africa, and a few African states -- Southeast Asia is almost entirely missing. For a region where messaging apps are how billions communicate, that blind spot matters. So this is also an open invitation: we want to map Southeast Asian encryption rules together. Concretely, we will discuss: 1. Which of the five types fits your country — or do we need a new one? 2. Where do backdoor, traceability, or shutdown pressures show up across the region? 3. Who would like to co-build a shared, open Southeast Asia encryption-policy dataset? |
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| Describe the Relevance of Your Session to APrIGF | |||||||||||
| This session sits squarely in the sub-theme "Digital Resilience and Building of Trust." Encryption is the foundation of security and privacy by design, and the issues we raise -- surveillance, platform governance and the role of digital actors, child-safety scanning, and digital sovereignty -- are named directly in that track. The "network-shutdown" type also speaks to resilience under fragmentation, disasters, and geopolitical conflict, while AI-based content scanning links to "AI Governance for Good." It connects to the overarching theme in a direct way: trust in the Internet depends on communications people can rely on. Backdoors, mandatory scanning, and shutdowns are exactly the tools deployed "in times of crisis," and they often weaken the very resilience they claim to protect. A clear regional map helps the community tell good-faith safety measures from disproportionate ones. Expected outcomes: * A shared, plain-language map of how Asia Pacific governments treat encryption, grounded in concrete recent cases. * The start of a Southeast Asia research collaboration: a working list of volunteers and a draft plan for an open, multi-country dataset that local experts, not outside observers, help build. * Inputs to the APrIGF Synthesis Document on encryption, surveillance, and digital sovereignty. |
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| Methodology / Agenda (Please add rows by clicking "+" on the right) | |||||||||||
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| Moderators & Speakers Info (Please complete where possible) - (Required) | |||||||||||
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| Please explain the rationale for choosing each of the above contributors to the session. | |||||||||||
| Masayuki Hatta is the organizer and presenter, and the author of the study behind this Showcase: a comparative analysis of E2EE regulation across 20 jurisdictions that builds the five-type framework presented here. The paper was accepted to ITS2026 Tokyo and presented in June 2026; a preprint is at https://ssrn.com/abstract=6861899. As the author, he can answer technical, legal, and policy questions on every case, and explain in plain language why "secure backdoors" cannot be built safely. His work covers encryption policy, internet governance, and open-source governance. He is also a board member of MIAU, a Japanese civil society group for internet users, and a steering committee member of the Japan IGF. As an academic from Japan, he brings an Asia Pacific view to a Western-dominated debate. To strengthen diversity, the organizer is seeking additional speakers across gender, region, and stakeholder group, especially SE Asian collaborators to co-present and extend the study. |
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| If you need assistance to find a suitable speaker to contribute to your session, or an onsite facilitator for your online-only session, please specify your request with details of what you are looking for. | |||||||||||
| Yes, we would welcome assistance on two fronts. First, the session's core aim is to extend our 20-jurisdiction encryption study into Southeast Asia, so we would be especially glad to be connected with co-presenters from countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Speakers from government, civil society, the technical community, or academia who can speak to encryption, surveillance, or platform regulation in their country would add exactly the local, multi-stakeholder perspective the research currently lacks. Second, if other proposals address encryption or surveillance policy, we would be very happy to join or support them rather than run a separate session, and are open to a merged session. We are also flexible on format. We have proposed a Showcase, but would welcome turning it into a BoF or another more interactive format if the Program Committee thinks it would better serve discussion and collaboration. |
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| Has AI been used to develop this proposal? | |||||||||||
| Yes | |||||||||||
| How: | |||||||||||
| Language editing and translation of the author's own Japanese drafts; all content and analysis are the author's own. | |||||||||||
| Please declare if you have any potential conflict of interest with the Program Committee 2026. | |||||||||||
| No | |||||||||||
| Are you or other session contributors planning to apply for the APrIGF Fellowship Program 2026? | |||||||||||
| No | |||||||||||
| Upon evaluation by the Program Committee, your session proposal may only be selected under the condition that you will accept the suggestion of merging with another proposal with similar topics. Please state your preference below: | |||||||||||
| Yes, I am willing to work with another session proposer on a suggested merger. | |||||||||||
| Brief Summary of Your Session | |||||||||||
| This 30-minute hybrid showcase session presented a comparative study of how governments regulate end-to-end encryption (E2EE) and invited participants to help extend that map to parts of the Asia Pacific it does not yet cover, especially Southeast Asia. Farieha Aziz (Bolo Bhi, Pakistan) opened and facilitated the session. Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University / MIAU, Japan) presented research comparing 20 jurisdictions (11 advanced democracies, 3 authoritarian states, 6 Global South countries) from 2015 to May 2026. He explained how E2EE works and how apps differ (Signal and WhatsApp by default; Telegram only in opt-in secret chats; WeChat not at all), and set out four routes governments use to get around it: breaking the lock (backdoors), looking over the shoulder (client-side scanning), tracing the sender (traceability and SIM/ID rules), and cutting the wire (shutdowns, app blocks, VPN restrictions). The study classifies jurisdictions into five ideal types: permissive, hybrid, conditional access, prohibitionist, and network shutdown-dependent. Four cases, updated to the end of September 2026, illustrated the routes: the UK’s order to Apple, the EU’s “Chat Control,” India’s traceability and SIM-binding rules, and election shutdowns in Uganda and Pakistan. The presenter also explained why backdoor demands keep returning despite expert consensus, and why platform resistance to states is selective. He acknowledged that Southeast Asia, Japan, South Korea and the Pacific are missing from the map, and that he coded all cases himself, relying partly on English-language and secondary sources. Early signals from Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia were offered as uncoded starting points for correction. Because the presentation ran long, the open discussion was shortened to about five minutes. Two participants from Nepal contributed, and a survey for contributors was shared via QR code and the online chat. |
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| Substantive Summary of the Key Issues Raised and the Discussion | |||||||||||
| 1. Many routes, one target. States seek access to encrypted communications through backdoor mandates, device-side scanning, traceability and identity rules, and network or app blocking. No advanced democracy openly bans encryption, but most have drifted into a “hybrid” middle that is now splitting: the Netherlands and Canada lean permissive, the UK leans toward conditional access, and Australia has gone all the way. In the presenter’s coding, the difference is explained by the strength of civil society and whether independent technical assessment is built into law-making. There is no single Global South model, and the classification is still evolving; for example, Pakistan may not fit the shutdown-dependent type, since it has acquired censorship capacity through imported surveillance technology. 2. A door for one is a door for all. Cryptographers have argued for nearly 30 years (1997, 2015, 2024) that “exceptional access” for good actors cannot be built safely, and the 2017 WannaCry attack, built from leaked NSA tools, showed the risk is real. The presenter argued that demands persist not from ignorance but from mutually reinforcing incentives: agencies’ reputation as guardians of safety, child-protection and counter-terrorism framing, and an interception and spyware industry that lobbies and advises. Technical rebuttals alone can even restart the loop, so the question is who is in the room. 3. Platforms resist selectively. Companies act almost like states, but fight only where markets matter and the state cannot hurt their core business; otherwise they comply or leave, as Apple did by withdrawing Advanced Data Protection in the UK. Rights should not depend on business calculation. These stakes are higher in the Global South, where E2EE protects activists, minorities and journalists, backdoors can leak to criminals, and imported “best practice” can misfit local capacity. Discussion: Two participants from Nepal described a different problem from state overreach. The first said Nepal has no baseline regulation in this area and asked how citizens can push for rules that improve security and privacy, and what roles government and platforms such as Meta should play. The second said that because smaller economies have little leverage over large companies, their users’ data is treated as “a rounding error,” and that South Asian countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan are underrepresented in debates on encryption and data sovereignty. He noted that law enforcement can obtain data from corporations but no encryption or data-protection standard exists, citing a major university’s registration portal that exposed students’ names, parents’ names, phone numbers and citizenship numbers, and unencrypted government records. No input from Southeast Asia was received during the session. |
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| Conclusions and Suggestions of Way Forward | |||||||||||
| The session confirmed that encryption policy in the region cannot be understood through Global North categories alone. The interventions from Nepal pointed to a dimension the five-type framework does not yet capture well: in smaller, lower-capacity jurisdictions, the main risk may be not only state demands for access but the absence of any baseline security and data-protection standards, combined with weak leverage over global platforms. This suggests extending future mapping beyond “what the state demands” to “what protection exists at all.” Suggested way forward: 1. Fill the map with local expertise. Participants from Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Pacific are invited to share one law, order or court case from their country, in any language, and to join as country co-coders and co-authors. A contributor survey was shared via QR code and the online chat; e-mail is an alternative where Google Forms is inaccessible. 2. Refine the framework. Test whether registration and licensing leverage over apps (seen in Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia) forms a distinct type, and add indicators for baseline protection and platform leverage raised in the discussion. 3. Warn early and respond together. Build a shared channel to flag new bills, directives and blocking orders, prepare joint submissions, and translate the cryptographers’ consensus into local languages. 4. Apply a common checklist to encryption bills: technical feasibility assessed independently before the vote; proportionality with judicial review and no demand for worldwide access; interoperability that does not push users toward weaker protection; and inclusion of civil society, researchers and Global South users with their costs covered. Points 3 and 4 were in the presentation slides but could not be presented in full due to time; the slides and paper (SSRN abstract 6861899) are being shared with participants. The organizers also plan to explore collaboration with existing efforts such as Global Partners Digital’s World Map of Encryption Laws and Policies. |
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| Number of Attendees (Please fill in numbers) | |||||||||||
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| Gender Balance in Moderators/Speakers (Please fill in numbers) | |||||||||||
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| How were gender perspectives, equality, inclusion or empowerment discussed? Please provide details and context. | |||||||||||
| Gender was not discussed as a standalone theme in this short session. Inclusion was addressed in other ways. The presentation stressed that E2EE matters most to those exposed to surveillance and retaliation, such as activists, journalists and minorities, and that Global North rules exported as “best practice” can exclude Global South realities. Participants from Nepal raised the underrepresentation of smaller South Asian countries in platform and policy decisions. The session was moderated by a woman digital rights advocate from Pakistan, and on-site and online participants were invited on equal terms. The proposed collaboration is designed to be led by local experts, with all contributors credited. | |||||||||||
| Consent | |||||||||||
I agree that my data can be submitted to forms.for.asia and processed by APrIGF organizers for the program selection of APrIGF 2026. |
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I agree that my data can be submitted to forms.for.asia and processed by APrIGF organizers for the program selection of APrIGF 2026.